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The Current State and Significance of 
Small Hydropower and Institutional Issues 
Concerning its Popularization
   Since the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant operated by 
Tokyo Electric Power Co. caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, the spread 
and promotion of power generation via renewable energies and distributed energy 
resources have become more important policy issues than ever for Japan. Solar 
and wind power get most of the attention in discussions of generating power with 
renewable energies, but small hydropower certainly has an important role to play. 
Small hydropower has less potential for development (i.e. scale of facility capacity) 
compared to solar and wind power, but compared to other means of power 
generation with renewable energy it enjoys many advantages such as an extremely 
high equipment utilization ratio, small load variation and fairly sound technology. 
We could say that the development of this is type of renewable energy generation is 
one that Japan should also prioritize. The first step should be to build distributed 
energy resource (DER) systems, particularly in mountainous areas, to generate 
power for consumption in nearby areas. Furthermore, local communities depend 
on the water resources in their area, so it is essential to take another look at local 
resources in the development process and contribute to stimulating local economies. 
While a variety of initiatives are underway across Japan, we may not have an 
adequate understanding of sites with the potential to generate small amounts of 
power through small hydropower. Thus, this warrants more detailed research.
  But generally speaking, popularizing and promoting renewable energy, which has 
higher generating costs than existing power sources, needs policy means to support 
it. In August 2011, the Japanese government passed into law the Act on Special 
Measures Concerning Renewable Energy and the fixed-tariff system for renewable 
energy will come into effect in July 2012. This will impose a long-term obligation 
on electric utilities to buy power generated by renewable energy at a certain price for 
the purpose of spreading and encouraging the adoption of these power generation 
methods. The tariffs and other matters will be decided by the Minister of Economy, 
Trade and Industry, who will do so based on the deliberations of the Procurement 
Cost Estimation Committee. On April 27, 2012, the committee released its 
proposals concerning tariffs for each type of renewable energy generation, including 
small hydropower.
   Traditionally, one reason why coordinating among “water rights” and other such 
matters has been a hindrance to the spread of small hydropower is the extremely 
complex administrative procedures. In recent years, Japan has seen a gradual 
relaxation of regulations and simplification of procedures while the direction the 
technology is heading in has become clearer since the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
but the government still has a number of matters under consideration. Although 
small hydropower still has room for technological development and cost reduction, 
it is a power-generating technology that could grow significantly with the relaxation 
of various systemic/institutional constraints, even without any technological 
breakthroughs. Considering the power situation in Japan today, the country needs 
further regulatory relaxation and procedural simplification.
(Original Japanese version: published in May/June 2012)
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   There are three types of disastrous risks from outer space that could cause 
harm on the Earth’s surface: space debris, space weather and Near-Earth Objects 
(NEOs). Due to recent incidents including a number of large satellites re-entering 
the atmosphere, large solar flares and near-misses between Near-Earth Asteroids 
(NEAs) and our planet, our current space monitoring infrastructure cannot entirely 
rule out the risk of a disaster originating from space. Thus, we must verify any 
serious threat posed to humanity’s existence and society’s infrastructure.
  Space Situational Awareness (SSA) has been the subject of great attention 
by experts in various fields in their efforts to raise a general awareness of the 
risks posed by the space environment and measures to counteract them. This 
goes beyond merely monitoring the space environment. Europe, the United 
States, China and others are hammering out policies that take SSA into account. 
However, the SSA concept itself has yet to take root in Japan. Although different 
organizations and research groups deal with the three types of space environment 
risk independently, their efforts are not yet integrated. Japan should gain a 
comprehensive understanding of space environment risk and establish measures to 
deal with it, such as by revising the Basic Plan for Space Policy.
  With regards to space debris in particular, Japan should coordinate with other 
countries to encourage the formulation of the Code of Conduct, an international 
framework for space activities. Furthermore, researchers across the globe are 
starting to develop technologies to guide large, uncontrollable space debris back 
down to Earth at a safe location. Japan should use its rendezvous technology and 
robotics to take the lead in researching and developing a viable space object capture 
system.
  It is imperative to continue monitoring daily space weather as well as watching out 
for gigantic NEOs that may appear in the future.
  In order to execute the above policies, there is an urgent need for Japan to 
recognize the importance of SSA and define the direction of the country’s SSA 
efforts in a policy paper. Meanwhile, Japan also needs to consider making efforts to 
train personnel to carry out activities that mitigate space environment risk.
(Original Japanese version: published in May/June 2012)
2 Space Situational Awareness to Mitigate Disastrous Risks from Space p.17
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Figure : Rapid Increase in Debris Due to Satellite Destruction and Collisions
Source: Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center from 
data published every January in the Satellite Situation Report from 
2006 through 2012.
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Japanese Researchers' Awareness Concerning 
the Use of Advanced Measurement and 
Analysis Instruments in the Life Sciences
   There is a need to make effective use of new, advanced measurement and analysis 
instruments to exploit innovations in life sciences. The Science and Technology 
Foresight Center conducted a written survey and held a workshop for experts to 
study Japanese researchers’ awareness of the use of advanced measurement and 
analysis instruments.
The survey found that in life sciences, the degree of dependence to foreign 
countries, especially to the United States, for advanced measurement and analysis 
instruments in Japan is much higher than in other research fields. The state-of-the-
art instruments supplied by foreign companies are standardizing over the domestic 
products. Japanese researchers tend to actively utilize the foreign-made instruments 
to collect high-quality data for international publications. Approximately 40% of the 
survey respondents feel the price gap between the instruments provided by Japanese 
and foreign manufacturers, especially the U.S., companies.
   The main subject of discussion at the workshop was the domestic-overseas 
price gap. Total costs of producing the foreign-made instruments are composed 
of diverse fixed and variable costs. Among them, costs for the import procedures, 
the maintenance and inspection and so on, help Japanese researchers purchase and 
use these instruments efficiently. The first thing Japanese researchers need to do in 
order to narrow the domestic-overseas price gap is for many of them to recognize 
that there is indeed a price gap between the instruments made in Japan and  foreign 
countries. Furthermore, we need to create a market to compete with foreign-made 
instruments, such as by stimulating the used instruments market and accelerating 
the development of Japanese-made instruments.
(Original Japanese version: published in July/August 2012)
Figure : How do instrument prices in Japan compare to other countries?
Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center
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The Need to Change the Concept of 
Water-related Disaster Prevention
Yasushi Ito
Visiting Fellow
Introduction
   Since the 1990s, we have known of the grave 
necessity, in terms of combating global warming, 
for power generation by renewable energies that do 
not directly produce CO2 emissions. However, the 
spread of such technologies has been slow due to 
the high cost of using renewable energies; the fact 
that many of them have difficulty providing a stable 
energy supply because of how they generate it and 
fluctuations caused by the natural environment; as 
well as—particularly in Japan—the weak support 
these technologies receive from government. On 
the other hand, it is well known that the disaster at 
the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant operated 
by Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), which was 
caused by the tsunami spawned by the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, has made the rapid spread of 
renewable energy an extremely important policy issue 
in Japan.
  One reason why we need to spread and expand our 
use of renewable energies is their small environmental 
impact. However, that is not all. Another big reason 
garnering attention is their compatibility with 
“distributed” energy resource (DER) systems. Until 
now, Japan’s power supply systems have mainly 
focused on setting up large power stations in remote 
locations and transmitting the power to where it is 
consumed. This is the “large-scale, concentrated 
model.” But the Great East Japan Earthquake showed 
that with this approach, an accident at a large power 
station has a huge effect over a widespread area. A 
system that depends on a certain amount of distributed 
energy resources to generate power with relatively 
small facilities located near where it is consumed can 
mitigate these kinds of supply risks. In March 2012, 
the National Policy Unit’s Energy and Environmental 
Council released the Energy Regulation and Reform 
Action Plan: Implementation of 28 Important Points 
1
for Green Growth (Draft), which also cites “the use 
and expansion of distributed energy resources” as a 
part of power system reforms.[1] Of course, distributed 
energy resources also come with supply risks, so a 
balance between “concentrated” and “distributed” is 
needed.
  Now when one mentions generating power with 
renewable energy, one often imagines doing so by 
conventional means such as solar, wind and biomass. 
Meanwhile, small hydropower has received relatively 
little attention. This is because hydropower is a fully 
developed, mature technology that is not seen as 
so much of a new frontier like solar power and the 
like. It may also be due to the impact of criticism 
directed at hydropower for causing environmental 
destruction with large dams, which is accompanied 
by criticism of public works projects. However, small 
hydropower generates more electricity in Japan 
today than any other method defined as “renewable 
energy generation,” and it has yet to live up to its full 
potential to develop and expand. Furthermore, while 
solar and wind power planning is done on a large 
scale, by definition small hydropower is not so large, 
thus making it compatible with future DER systems. 
Among all renewable energies, small hydropower fits 
the requirements for low environmental impact and 
compatibility with distributed systems extremely well.
  This report will outline the state of small hydropower 
(primarily in Japan) and the significance of its 
expansion, followed by an examination focusing on 
the systemic/institutional issues related to further 
spreading and developing this technology. For 
information about the technical aspects of hydropower, 
please refer to the March 2010 issue of Science & 
Technology Trends Quarterly Review, which took up 
this topic.[2]
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The Current State of Small 
Hydropower and its Growth 
Potential
2-1 Definition of Small Hydropower
   As is evident from its name, small hydropower is 
a form of hydroelectric power that generates small 
amounts of electricity output, but there is no precise 
definition regarding the exact scale. For example, 
the European Small Hydropower Association 
(ESHA) defines it as hydropower with an output of 
10,000 kW or less.[3] In Japan, the New Energy and 
Industrial Technology Development Organization 
(NEDO) classifies hydropower according to output in 
the following manner : 1,000 to 10,000 kW is small 
hydropower, 100 to 1,000 kW is mini hydropower, and 
output below 100 kW is micro hydropower.[4] However, 
these definitions are not necessarily in general use. 
As addressed later in this report, the Act on Special 
Measures Concerning New Energy Use by Operators 
of Electric Utilities that went into effect in 2003 to 
promote “new energy” supports hydropower with an 
output of less than 1,000 kW, while the Act on Special 
Measures Concerning Renewable Energy enacted in 
August 2011 aims to promote hydropower with an 
output of less than 30,000 kW, which it terms “small- 
to medium-sized hydropower.” This report examines 
small hydropower by defining it with the standard of 
10,000 kW of output or less—which is often adopted 
internationally.
  While hydropower generally makes use of hydraulic 
head, there are four forms in which the water is used: 
flowing water, reservoirs, storage tanks and pumping. 
As for ensuring hydraulic head used to generate 
power, there are three methods: conduits, dams, and 
a dam/conduit combination.[5] Since in many cases 
small hydropower uses relatively small flows and 
hydraulic head, it generally generates power by either 
using flowing water as is (instead of damming a river 
or employing storage tanks) or by placing a weir over 
a river upstream to collect water and direct it into 
a channel to create hydraulic head.[6] However, an 
extremely small-scale project may employ a dam.
2-2 Where Small Hydropower is Used
   Until now, small hydropower has mainly been used 
on rivers and channels such as agricultural waterways, 
catering to power demand by local communities 
(rural villages, etc.), with the surplus being sold off in 
many cases. In principle, small hydropower is possible 
anywhere there is hydraulic head, so it has also been 
used inside water utility facilities as well as buildings 
and other structures. We are gradually seeing more 
and more small hydropower inside water utility 
facilities and general buildings, where setup mostly 
requires no complicated procedures.
2-3 The State of Small Hydropower Thus Far and 
Future Growth Potential
   According to estimates of “areas with long-lasting 
energy” by Chiba University’s Research Center on 
Public Affairs for a Sustainable Welfare Society and 
the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies (ISEP), 
an NPO, hydropower with an output of 10,000 kW 
or less accounted for 61.05% of power generated by 
renewable energies in 2008, while hydropower with 
output of less than 1,000 kW accounted for 5.04%, 
more than the 4.17% share generated by biomass.[7]
However, this is not the result of a recent proactive 
push to develop small hydropower. Rather, the rate of 
growth for small hydropower has long been slower 
than that for solar and wind power. This shows that 
small-scale hydropower plants built in the past are still 
operating today.
  There are a number of estimates concerning small 
hydropower’s future growth potential. Table 1 shows 
the potential scope for development that hydropower 
has according to the Water Power Resource Survey 
(March 2004) conducted by the Agency for Natural 
Resources and Energy. According to this, there is 
still room to develop a total of 6 million kW or more 
from hydropower with an output of 10,000 kW or 
less per power generation facility.[8] On the other 
hand, there is little room for development of power 
generation facilities with an output of 1,000 kW or 
less. Generally, the smaller the output category, the 
more undeveloped sites, but only the output category 
of less than 1,000 kW has an extremely low estimated 
number of undeveloped sites. Normally, the smaller 
the output level, the easier it is to install equipment 
and the more sites are available. From its outset, the 
above-mentioned Water Power Resource Survey has 
not considered mountain streams and small rivers 
thought not to be very economical in its estimates,[9] 
so the author believes it highly likely that the potential 
for small-scale sites has been underestimated.
  The Survey on the Potential for Adding Renewable 
2
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Energy published by the Ministry of the Environment 
(MOE) in March 2011 contains estimates for small 
hydropower’s potential. Figure 1 compiles these 
estimates. Here, the potential for adding hydropower 
with an output of 10,000 kW or less per power 
generation facility (on rivers) is approximately 
13 million kW.[10] Because the potential here is a 
theoretically estimated amount that does not consider 
the stricter constraints that would accompany it, the 
actual potential is that which subtracts unusable sites 
due to natural or social constraints. However, this 
figure does not subtract the portion that is already 
in use. According to the Water Power Resource 
Survey in Table 1, approximately 3.5 million kW of 
hydropower with an output of 10,000 kW or less per 
power generation facility has already been developed, 
so some simple math (13 mil kW - 3.5 mil kW) would 
put the unused potential at around 9.5 million kW. 
This amount produced by this simple subtraction 
is not precise since each survey employed different 
calculation methods, but it does allow us to understand 
the general situation.
  The MOE estimates that there are 18,229 sites that 
could produce less than 1,000 kW each and that they 
have the potential to generate around 5.3 million kW 
of power hydropower. This is larger than the amount 
estimated by the Water Power Resource Survey in 
Table 1, but some experts have indicated that this is 
still an underestimate.[11] The ministry estimates that 
there are 593 locations conducive to small hydropower 
Power
(kW) Output Generation Output Generation Output Generation
（kW） (MWh) （kW） (MWh) （kW） (MWh)
Under
1,000 474 203,462 1,268,665 8 1,297 29,578 371 242,190 1,218,611
Total 1,888 21,852,247 91,995,357 0.32 750,367 2,043,638 2,713 12,128,390 45,877,298
Average . 11,574 48,726 . 23,449 63,864 . 4,470 16,910
Sites Sites
744,930 4,181,420 9 17,570 95,715
Developed Under Construction Undeveloped
Sites
625,415 3,312,857 2 6,700 30,846 523
147,897 340 2,287,800 9,174,150
1,232 2,262,500 9,193,048
6,036,800 27,939,264 6 90,500
1,961,900 7,887,463
1,941,550 10,028,377 4 29,500
367,799 209 3,313,000 12,331,126
521,726 14
1 21 801,900 2,610,5003,466,800 15,238,149 1 1
11 61,800
1,000 -
3,000
3,000 -
5,000
5,000 -
10,000
10,000 -
30,000
30,000 -
50,000 91
363
287
166
417
850,077 3 378,000 1,109,000
64 4,189,990 16,398,31650,000 -100,000
100,000+
879,100 2,353,400
26 4,643,300 13,628,309 2 543,000
Source: Compiled by the Science & Technology Foresight Center based on materials from the Agency for Natural Resources 
and Energy website (http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/hydraulic/index.html).
Table 1 : Water Power Resource Estimates by the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
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Figure 1 : Small Hydropower Potential (MOE Survey)
Source: Compiled by the Science & Technology Foresight Center based on materials 
from Reference #10.
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on agricultural waterways, with a potential output 
of roughly 258,000 kW. Kobayashi (2011) studied 
agricultural waterways on alluvial soil where small 
hydropower facilities have already been installed. 
He calculated an estimate of the scope for potential 
development on a main waterway (approximately 18 
km in length) and a lateral canal (12 km in length). 
Considering that small hydropower is feasible where 
this is a certain amount of hydraulic head, he found 
100 suitable locations along a total of roughly 30 km 
of agricultural waterways. Japan is said to have 40,000 
km of lateral canals for agricultural water. Even if 
there are few agricultural waterways to be found that 
are suitable because their water flows over flat ground, 
Kobayashi argues that the MOE’s estimate of only 
593 locations along 40,000 km is too low a figure. 
More detailed research is warranted, especially on the 
potential to produce output of less than 1,000 kW per 
generating facility.
The Significance of Promoting 
Small Hydropower and Problems
3-1 Small Hydropower's Advantages[12]
   Small hydropower’s advantages when compared to 
other forms of renewable energy are:
1. Equipment utilization is around 60% to 70%, much 
higher than generating power with other renewable 
energies.
2. Relatively small output fluctuation makes it unlikely 
to destabilize the power grid.
3. Preliminary surveys and construction are relatively 
simple.
4. The basic technology for hydropower has already 
matured, so the technology itself is fairly sound.
  On the other hand, small hydropower experiences the 
following problems:
1. Other parties have interests in using water 
resources, and legal procedures to start up a new 
power station are complex.
2. In general, producing many of the same pieces 
Type Small Hydro Solar Wind
Utilization approx. 70% approx. 12% approx. 20%
37-46 yen/kWh 10-14 yen/kWh
(Residential) (Land, 4.5+ MW)
Only generates
during the day.
Generation
fluctuates
according to
amount of sunlight.
Cost 8-25 yen/kWh
Notes
Little temporal
variation in
generation.
Generation
fluctuates
according to wind
strength.
Source: Compiled by the Science & Technology Foresight Center based on materials 
from the MOE website 
(http://www.env.go.jp/earth/ondanka/shg/page02.html).
Table 2 : Characteristics of Major Renewable Energy Generation
Solar (Ref.)
Small Hydro: Heavy Flow
(If flow exceeds maximum 
intake)
Small Hydro: Water 
Shortage
(Less than maximum 
intake)
During a water shortage, generation drops as intake gradually drops 
with the water's flow.
Hourly Output Daily Generation over 1 Year
Figure 2 : Small Hydropower Max Output and Output Ratio Change (Visualization)
Source: Cited from the MOE website (http://www.env.go.jp/earth/ondanka/shg/page02.html).
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of equipment is best to keep down power 
generation costs, but because each site has its own 
characteristics (hydraulic head and discharge) 
that vary greatly, equipment specifications must 
accommodate, thus making mass production of 
equipment relatively ineffective compared to other 
power generation equipment.
3-2 What is the Significance of Promoting Small 
Hydropower?
  When compared to solar, wind and other such 
forms of generating power with renewable energy, 
the potential to add small hydropower is small. This 
may be why some people question the significance of 
promoting the growth of this technology.
  First, a look at small hydropower’s potential shows 
us that it cannot become Japan’s primary source of 
power. However, Japan has been forced to reduce its 
reliance on nuclear energy since the accident at the 
Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant caused by the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, but at the same time we 
need to cut down on carbon dioxide emissions in order 
to stop global warming. Under such circumstances, 
increasing power output by renewable energies even a 
little bit would be significant so long as the costs are not 
too great. For example, if the MOE’s estimate that there 
is a potential to add approximately 10.5 million kW of 
small hydropower generating capacity with facilities 
producing 10,000 kW of electricity or less is correct, 
then developing all of these sites would be equivalent 
to around 4% of the 237.15 million kW generated by 
all general electric utilities in 2009.[13] This is no small 
amount in a time when we are asked to maximize our 
energy conservation efforts. While some have said that 
the potential to add small hydropower is comparatively 
small, one could counter that its potential can be 
projected to a certain extent—more accurately than 
what we can project for solar and wind power. In other 
words, small hydropower is a renewable energy we 
could develop that has relatively low technical and 
economic risks and it is a renewable energy source 
that we should prioritize for development.
  Additionally, the significance of promoting the 
growth of small hydropower is not only limited to 
increasing the overall amount of power supplied from 
renewable energy. The above-mentioned estimates 
for renewable energy power output in the Areas with 
Long-lasting Energy includes estimates for “natural 
energy power self-sufficiency,” which shows to what 
extent renewable energy meets an area’s residential 
and farming/fisheries sector power demand. As of 
2008, more than 30 municipalities had 100% “power 
self-sufficiency” and the number with 50% or better 
reached 67.
  Most of these municipalities are small communities 
located in mountainous areas suitable for small 
hydropower. Even at present, small hydropower meets 
a hefty share of power demand in these municipalities 
(and nearby areas). If untapped small hydropower 
potential were developed, it would be a significant 
boost for communities with high amounts of latent 
“energy (i.e. power) self-sufficiency.”
  Providing power, which the Great East Japan 
Earthquake turned into a pressing issue, reconfirmed 
the importance of adopting systems based to a certain 
extent on distributed energy resources. However, 
transitioning a power supply system to a distributed 
model requires sufficient preparation and time. 
Spreading the use of small hydropower, which has 
high equipment utilization and a relatively low load 
variation compared to other renewable energies, 
would be the first step to demonstrating the feasibility 
of a system based on distributed energy resources 
that generates power close to where it is consumed, 
especially in mountainous areas suitable for small 
hydropower and their surrounding areas.
Growing Small Hydropower as a 
Community Development Model
   Small hydropower’s generating capacity is 
constrained by a site’s unique natural features 
(discharge, hydraulic head, etc.) as well as social 
constraints (water rights, etc.; discussed in further 
detail below). In order to generate small hydropower, 
one must look at the area’s water resources, coordinate 
with the local interests and engage in sufficient 
discussion, but this is also an essential process for 
stimulating local economies. In fact, there are places 
throughout Japan that are adopting and using small 
hydropower to try and create sustainable communities. 
One could say that these small hydropower projects are 
“community development models” for rural areas.[14] 
Let us look at some examples below.
  A local NPO in Omachi, Nagano Prefecture 
(population about 30,000) used small hydropower on 
some of the agricultural waterways running through 
4
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the city to produce energy for local use. The NPO also 
used the sites to reduce the environmental impact of 
tourist facilities and for producing local specialties, as 
well as to teach visitors about the environment, in an 
attempt to revitalize the community.[15] After the small 
hydropower facility took shape, the NPO encountered 
the systemic/institutional barrier posed by water rights 
(discussed in further detail below) and the technical 
issue of whether it was actually possible to generate 
power on agricultural waterways. The NPO secured 
three test sites, appended a consent form from each 
land improvement district (LID) and submitted water 
usage applications in accordance with the River Act. 
Then, they started small hydropower performance 
testing while at the same time organizing events 
such as a symposium on natural energy and local 
history and a study group on mini hydropower. Later, 
after the small hydroelectric power stations began 
operating, the NPO has conducted eco tours of them 
(three locations with maximum output of 800 W, 300 
W and 700 W) and used the sites for studying the 
environment.
   In the Itoshiro district of Kujo, Gifu Prefecture, 
home to around 300 residents, another local NPO 
is working on a small hydropower project.[16] The 
NPO hoped to revitalize the local community as its 
population has failed to halt its decline. The district 
had had a small hydroelectric power station until 1955, 
so the NPO began working on small hydropower as 
a way to “discover new things by studying the past.” 
The project got underway in 2007. The local economy 
was stimulated in line with the small hydropower 
project’s progress and efforts were started up to 
encourage people from outside the district to settle 
there. There were some new residents who decided to 
move to Itoshiro after coming there to tour the small 
hydropower facilities. Recently, in June 2011, a 2.2 
kW small hydropower facility began operating on an 
agricultural waterway, and there are plans to transmit 
the power generated to an adjacent agricultural 
produce processing facility.
   Of course, in the future small hydropower will 
need to transform from a symbol of community 
development into a means of meeting a certain 
amount of local power demand.
Policy Means to Further Promote 
Small Hydropower
  Because generating power with renewable 
energies is typically expensive at present—with 
some exceptions—it will be difficult to spread 
Prefecture Municipality
Self-
Sufficiency
(%)
Prefecture Municipality
Self-
Sufficiency
(%)
Prefecture Municipality
Self-
Sufficiency
(%)
Sobetsu 181.68 Itoigawa 72.95 Minamiyamashiro 97.01
Niseko 177.27 Tsunami 65.26 Kasagi 62.88
Rankoshi 141.31 Myoko 58.03 Kamikitayama 249.93
Aibetsu 119.46 Aga 57.28 Yoshino 60.17
Aomori Fukaura 99.61 Asahi 95.76 Wakasa 98.1
Kawai 96.89 Tateyama 77.54 Haku 82.03
Iwaizumi 74.28 Uozu 53.5 Kofu 51.88
Miyagi Shichikashuku 131.22 Kamiichi 52.13 Yazu 50.08
Kazuno 55.77 Yamanashi Hayakawa 347.18 Shimane Tsuwano 53.45
Higashinaruse 50.25 Oshika 788.81 Okuyama Kagamino 103.02
Nishikawa 174.13 Hiraya 542.93 Tokushima Miyoshi 68.54
Okura 68.65 Sakae 604.87 Ehime Kumakogen 126.06
Asahi 66.25 Komi 191.91 Niyodogawa 157.18
Shimogo 169.29 Yasuoka 138.16 Otoyo 137.83
Furudono 152.19 Anan 137.28 Itsuki 1594.61
Kawauchi 75.43 Nagiso 130.79 Mizukami 844.32
Kuni 608.88 Achi 129.18 Sagara 142.21
Katashina 298.21 Otari 109.71 Oguni 114.34
Tsumagoi 87.03 Agematsu 97.64 Yamato 107.42
Naganohara 58.64 Shibakawa 106.72 Nishimera 528.08
Kanagawa Yamakita 199.55 Oyama 83.2 Hinokage 99.78
Mie Odai 77.36 Gokase 74.67
Kagoshima Minamiosumi 64.18
Nara
Tottori
Kochi
Kumamoto
Iwate
Akita
Yamagata
Fukushima
Niigata
Toyama
Nagano
Shizuoka
Miyazaki
Kyoto
Hokkaido
Gunma
Source: Compiled by the Science & Technology Foresight Center based on "Areas with Long-Lasting Energy (2008)" 
from the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies, Chiba University.
Table 3 : Municipalities with 50%+ Small Hydro Self-Sufficiency (2008)
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these technologies without some sort of supportive 
government policies, whether in Japan or other 
countries. Below is an outline of policy means to 
promote the spread of small hydropower in Japan.
5-1 Act on Special Measures Concerning New 
Energy Use by Operators of Electric Utilities 
(the Renewable Portfolio Standard [RPS] 
Law)
  Japan’s RPS law enacted in April 2003 obliges 
electric utilities to use new energies and such to 
generate at least a certain percentage of their power. 
As for hydropower,the law initially only applies to 
hydroelectric stations on waterways, with output of 
less than 1,000 kw, but an amendment to the law in 
April 2007 expands the scope to include waterways 
with small dams. The amount of renewable energy that 
each electric utility is required to use is determined 
according to the “Use Target for Electricity from New 
Energy, etc. by Electric Utilities” that are formulated 
every four years by the Minister of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI) for the forthcoming eight years. 
The total use target for FY 2010 was set at 12.2 billion 
kWh (1.35% of electricity sold in Japan).
  The most important feature of the RPS law is that 
it allows the trading of “New Energy Certificates.” 
Thus, when a party produces electricity with 
renewable energy, the new energy certificates are 
issued. Utilities can also purchase certificates to 
fulfill their obligations. For example, an electric 
utility operating in an area with no sites suitable for 
small hydropower can fulfill its obligations relatively 
cheaply by purchasing New Energy Certificates from 
another party that has set up small hydroelectric power 
stations, instead of having to build its own such power 
stations at great cost.
5-2 Act on Special Measures Concerning 
Renewable Energy (the Feed-In Tariff Law)
  While the RPS law is a policy means that should 
soundly achieve the targets in the obligations it 
imposes on electric utilities, they will not generate 
more power with renewable energy than obliged 
to unless given an incentive to do so. This thus 
risks setting a veritable “ceiling” on the spread of 
renewable energies if the obligated amounts are 
low. Furthermore, the term “renewable energy” 
encompasses a range of technologies at significantly 
varying stages of development, so of course the cost of 
generating power with them varies as well. If electric 
utilities are only required to use a certain amount of 
renewable energy of any sort, then they will focus 
on the relatively cheaper power generation methods 
and the policy will not end up encouraging the 
spread of diverse types of power generation. In fact, 
according to research that used national panel data to 
quantitatively analyze the effect of policy means and 
such on patent applications concerning renewable 
energy-related technology, RPSs increase the number 
of patent applications for wind power technology, 
which at present is relatively lucrative cost-wise 
compared to other forms of renewable energy, but 
they do not result in more patent applications for solar 
power and other forms of renewable energy that are 
not as cost-efficient.[17]
  Europe, where renewable energy is spreading, is 
encouraging this by introducing “feed-in tariffs” that 
oblige electric utilities to buy electricity generated 
by renewable energy at a high enough price to allow 
the producers to recover their costs over the long 
term. More people are calling for the introduction 
of this system in Japan. By guaranteeing renewable 
energy producers long-term electricity sales at a price 
sufficient to recover the cost of their investment, feed-
in tariffs provide renewable energy companies with 
a high level of predictability to create a system that 
promotes generation with renewable energy. Japan 
first introduced a feed-in tariff system in November 
2009 that was limited to surplus energy generated 
with solar power. The initial purchase price was set 
at 48 yen/kWh for residences and 24 yen/kWh for 
non-residences over a period of 10 years. Thereafter, 
the system was expanded to include all renewable 
energies via the Act on Special Measures Concerning 
Renewable Energy that passed the Diet on August 
26, 2011, but it only comes into effect on July 1, 
2012. Specifically, the law requires electric utilities to 
purchase all power generated with solar, wind, hydro 
(small- to medium-sized hydropower with output 
of less than 30,000 kW), geothermal and biomass 
(though only surplus power in the case of residential 
solar power), the cost of which utilities incur will be 
transferred to entire customers as a “Surcharge for 
renewable energy” added to customers’ electricity 
bills that is proportionate to the power they consume. 
In other words, power consumers will bear the burden 
in the form of higher electricity bills. The higher the 
tariffs, the greater the cost borne by power consumers. 
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Figure 3 : Feed-in Tariff Syustem Structure
Source : Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center, based on materials 
from the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 
However, enterprises whose expenses from purchasing 
power exceed a certain proportion of their sales will 
be granted reduced surcharges. In addition, due to 
the possibility that the speed at which renewable 
energies spread may vary by area, the law will set up 
a body to coordinate the size of the cost burden for 
power consumers. This cost burden coordinator will 
temporarily collect the surcharges levied by electric 
utilities and then give each power company the money 
in the form of a grant according to the actual cost of 
tariffs (see Figure 3). It should be noted that the RPS 
law will be nullified when the feed-in tariff system 
goes into effect.
  The degree to which renewable energy will spread 
is determined by tariff rates, their expiration dates 
and the like. The METI, while respecting the opinion 
of the Procurement Cost Estimation Committee (an 
impartial third-party committee of five members 
formed by the upper and lower houses of the Diet), 
decides these matters for each type of renewable 
energy, installation, size and so forth. After the 
committee’s first meeting on March 6, 2012, it 
continued debate while hearing comments from many 
renewable energy-related enterprises, then announced 
its proposal on tariffs and expiration dates on April 27 
(see Table 4). As for small hydropower, it was divided 
into three categories of generation facilities according 
to installed capacity: less than 200 kW; 200 to 999 
Figure 6 – Feed-In Tariff System Structure 
 
 
 
 
Power 
Company
Renewable 
energy 
utilities/homes 
(solar power 
surplus) 
Power 
Consumers 
Sale of electricity generated 
with renewable energy 
Bought for 
gov't-mandated/time 
period price 
Electricity supplied 
Collected as charge 
in electric bills 
Feed-In Coordinator
Deliver charges 
collected for 
feed-in expenses 
Grants for 
feed-in expenses
Procurement Cost 
Estimation Committee 
Set charge per kWh 
Nat'l Gov't 
Set feed-in tariffs and 
time periods 
Source: Compiled by the Science & Technology Foresight Center based on materials from 
the Ag ncy for Natural Resources and Energy. 
incl. tax base
42.00 40 25
42.00 42 10
23.10 22 20
53.75 55 20
27.30 26 15
42.00 40 15
25.20 24 20
30.45 29 20
35.70 34 20
40.95 39 20
Unused Wood 33.60 32 20
Regular Wood 25.20 24 20
General Waste/Sewage 17.85 17 20
Recycled Wood 13.65 13 20
Small/
Medium
Hydropowe
Direct
Fuel
Combustio
n
Gasification
Biomass
10+ kW
Under 10 kW (purchase of surplus)
20+ kW
Under 15,000 kW
1,000 kW - 29,999 kW
200 kW - 999 kW
Under 200 kW
Solar
Wind
Purchase
Period
( )
Source Output
Under 20 kW
15,000+ kWGeothermal
Price (Yen)
Source: Compiled by the Science & Technology Foresight Center based on 
materials from the Procurement Cost Estimation Committee.
Table 4 : Procurement Cost Estimation Committee Proposal (as of April 27, 2012)
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kW; and 1,000 to 29,999 kW. Tariffs were set at 35.70, 
30.45 and 25.20 yen, respectively, while expiration 
dates were set at 20 years following commencement 
for all three categories.
  For three years after the law takes effect, tariffs will 
be set with particular consideration given to the profits 
of parties that generate power with renewable energy, 
in order to expand the concentrated use of renewable 
energy, thus reflecting the committee’s proposal on 
this point. Tariffs and expiration dates will be revised 
every fiscal year, taking into consideration the cost 
of generating each kind of energy and other relevant 
matters.
5-3 Subsidies for Capital Investment
  Subsidies for capital investments in renewable 
energy are a subsidization policy that has been 
carried out since a relatively early period. The METI, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF) and other government agencies have set up 
subsidies for construction and other costs associated 
with hydroelectric power stations.
  At present, the METI offers various subsidies 
for small- and medium-sized hydroelectric power 
stations: a subsidy for the construction costs other than 
the introduction of new technology (20% for power 
stations with an output of 1,000 to 4,999 kW, 10% 
for an output of 5,000 to 29,999 kW) and a subsidy 
for the cost of introducing new technology (50% for 
an output of 1,000 to 29,999 kW). In FY 2011, the 
ministry granted subsidies to 14 small- and medium-
sized hydroelectric power stations. Together with 
geothermal power utility subsidies, they amounted to 
approximately 2 billion yen.
  MAFF subsidies are managed as part of land 
improvement projects (irrigation drainage, etc.), 
rural development projects and the like. It used to 
be that one-off maintenance confined only to power 
generation facilities was not covered by MAFF 
subsidies, but new installations and renovations to 
single pieces of generating equipment have been 
allowed for some projects since FY 2009. Many of the 
MAFF’s subsidies cover 50% of expenses, relatively 
high compared to the METI’s.
The Water Rights Problem
  Water rights are an especially high hurdle to 
surmount when operating small hydropower. When 
using river water for hydropower, one must obtain 
a “water usage permit.” Even if one were to use 
water for hydropower that is already permitted 
for agricultural, industrial or other use, a new 
permit is required because the purpose is different. 
Furthermore, getting a permit even for small-scale 
hydropower generally requires going through the 
same procedures as those for large-scale hydropower 
produced by a dam. In the cases of the municipalities 
discussed earlier in this report, for its application to 
use the water, the organization generating the power (in 
this case a local NPO) had to obtain consent from the 
LID as well as from the organization permitted to use 
the water for agriculture. A water usage application 
takes a year-and-a-half from the prior consultations 
to obtaining the official permit. It has also been 
reported that when a single small hydroelectric power 
facility exceeded the scale of the initial plan that was 
originally discussed during the application process, it 
incurred a backlash from the local LID and the water 
wheel eventually had to be removed.[18] This is how 
operating even a small-scale generation project of less 
than 1,000 kW of output requires negotiating among 
various water rights.
  However, the RPS law relaxed the procedural 
requirements for permits and water rights as they 
concern small hydropower by targeting the technology 
for promotion.[19] In 2005, the amount of paperwork 
for using water that is subordinate to other water usage 
was reduced. That has, for example, simplified the 
permit procedures if one were to take water already 
permitted for agricultural use and draw it from a field 
to generate small hydroelectric power (subordinate 
power generation). In the following year, 2006, it was 
made known that if one were to use water for small 
hydropower after it has already been completely 
used for its permitted purpose, then no new permit is 
required. As an example, no new permit is needed if 
one were to generate small hydroelectric power on a 
channel that is currently used only as a drainage ditch.
  This is how government can simplify some of the 
many procedures required when water rights for 
agricultural and other use have already been assigned, 
but problems still remain. Regarding the use of water 
for agriculture, water can be drawn from waters for 
agricultural use during paddy cultivation, but only a 
limited amount can be drawn during winter, when no 
farming occurs. Thus, power generation that depends 
on agricultural water becomes impossible in winter.[20] 
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If one wants to secure access to an amount of water 
in winter as well in order to generate power, then the 
purpose of the water right becomes power generation, 
thus requiring the power producer to obtain another 
new permit.
  A power producer that takes water directly from 
a river has to obtain a new water right for power 
generation. Furthermore, the procedures become 
incredibly complex because the consent of any 
persons or entities affected by taking the water is also 
required.
  Even after obtaining a permit to use water for power 
generation, operation is still made difficult. The 
maximum amount of water that the power producer 
can take per second is prescribed by the water usage 
permit, so the electric utility must never take more 
than this amount of water. However, from the time 
the Great East Japan Earthquake struck until April 
30, 2011, when power supplies had difficulty meeting 
demand, power producers were temporarily allowed 
to exceed the volume-per-second rule so long as 
their 24-hour average of water taken did not surpass 
the amount permitted. This measure allowed power 
producers to take less water from rivers at night 
while taking more during the day to help cope with 
peak daytime electricity demand by generating more 
power at that time.[21] Since it is extremely difficult 
for a power producer required to comply with a 
volume-per-second rule to manage operations while 
responding every second to a natural flow of water 
that is constantly changing, power producers typically 
take only around 95% of the permitted volume so that 
they do not exceed it due to some sort of disturbance. 
However, a requirement to comply with a one-day 
average allows a power producer to adjust even if it takes 
a somewhat larger amount of water earlier in the day, 
thus reaching nearly 100% of the permitted amount and 
generating around 5% more power.[22] Although there 
have been urgent calls to make this measure more 
than temporary, the government did not do so. Instead, 
it relaxed the regulation only somewhat, requiring 
power producers not to take more than the permitted 
amount of water each hour.[23]
  The labyrinthine procedures associated with 
obtaining water rights and other regulations that 
hinder the spread of small hydropower are gradually 
being relaxed and improved. For example, the Great 
East Japan Earthquake Special Reconstruction Zone Act 
and the General Special Zone Act that came into effect 
in 2011 have simplified subordinate power generation-
related procedures and shortened the standard amount 
of time for processing paperwork.[24] Furthermore, 
in March 2012 the government announced that 
environmental impact assessments for rivers and 
other requirements had been waived for certain small 
hydropower projects. The government also established 
a consultation desk for procedures relating to water 
rights for power generation. However, many matters 
concerning procedural simplification are still in the 
review phase.[25]
Conclusions: The Significance 
of Small Hydropower and 
Related Issues
 Compared to solar and wind power, small 
hydropower does not have great growth potential in 
terms of quantitative power output. However, it does 
compare favorably to other means of generating power 
with renewable energies because of its high equipment 
utilization, low load f luctuation and the mature 
technologies it employs. Another advantage of small 
hydropower is its compatibility with a power supply 
system employing a “distributed model” that generates 
power for consumption in nearby areas. In addition, 
it is essential to examine the local area's resources 
and environment during the process of developing 
small hydropower because it depends on local water 
resources. Thus, it can contribute to stimulating the 
local economy. This is in fact happening in many 
places in Japan. While small hydropower receives less 
attention than other means of generating power with 
renewable energies, such as solar and wind power, it is 
very significant for us to encourage the growth of this 
technology.
  With regards to quantitative estimates of the potential 
to add new small hydropower, especially for small-
scale projects generating less than 1,000 kW, we may 
not have an adequate understanding. More detailed 
research is needed. While small hydropower still has 
room to develop cost-cutting techniques, it is a power 
generation technology that could expand greatly if 
various infrastructure restraints were relaxed, even 
without any technical breakthroughs. Although 
the complex procedures for water rights and other 
impediments to the technology’s spread are gradually 
being relaxed, we are not yet encouraging small 
hydropower enough. While it goes without saying 
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that there are historical reasons for the difficult water 
rights procedures and that we will need to thoroughly 
examine the effects of further regulatory relaxation, 
when we consider the state of the power supply in 
Japan today, we see that we need to urgently examine 
problems such as specific benefits as well as the costs 
and other problems associated with the spread of small 
hydropower, and also take another look at the various 
regulations, including an examination of the effect of 
relaxing regulations such as water usage procedures 
that the government has required thus far.
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Space Situational Awareness to 
Mitigate Disastrous Risks from Space
Teruhisa tsujIno
Visiting Fellow
Introduction
   In recent years, there has been rising interest in the 
risk of a disaster produced by the environment in outer 
space.
  Rather than experts in various fields monitoring the 
space environment independently, the global focus 
has turned toward broadly educating people across 
fields about the likelihood of disasters originating in 
space and ways to counteract them. These efforts are 
termed Space Situational Awareness. Unlike space 
surveillance , SSA includes activities to publicize the 
results of monitoring the space environment.
  There are three types of disaster risks posed by the 
dangers of space on the Earth’s surface (hereinafter 
referred to as “space environment risk”): 1) “space 
debris” (danger posed to operational satellites and 
the Earth’s surface by a collision/descent of satellites 
orbiting the Earth at high speed or their fragments), 2)
space weather (danger posed to orbiting satellites and 
ground-based infrastructure by geomagnetic storms, 
solar wind and other phenomena produced by solar 
activity) and 3) near-Earth objects (NEOs; the risk of 
asteroids, comets and other objects in an elliptical orbit 
around the Sun which intersect with the Earth’s orbit).
  This paper will address trends concerning 
research on the hypothetical risks associated with 
space debris, space weather and NEOs—the main 
subjects of concern for SSA—and corresponding 
countermeasures.
What is Space Environment Risk?
  The October 2004 edition of this journal published 
a report on the space environment and monitoring 
its changes. This report provided an overview of 
measures to monitor, defend against and mitigate 
the risk posed by space debris, satellite damage due 
to severe near-Earth space weather produced by the 
1
Sun, as well as the likelihood of a near-Earth asteroid 
collision.[1] Below, this paper will primarily discuss, 
based on how the situation has changed since then, 
the state of and danger posed by each type of space 
environment risk that could lead to a disaster on the 
Earth’s surface.
2-1 Risks of Space Debris
(1) The Situation of Space Debris
  According to the Satellite Situation Report[2] 
issued on January 9, 2012, 38,044 objects have been 
registered as orbiting the Earth thus far (as of the 
end of 2011), of which 21,723 have already burned 
up in the atmosphere. Figure 1 shows the number of 
objects placed into orbit by  Russia, the United States, 
the European Space Agency (ESA), France, Japan, 
China and India. Objects flying through space with 
a diameter of 10 cm or wider are cataloged for the 
report. There are thought to be hundreds of thousands 
of smaller pieces of space debris. Because they orbit 
the Earth at very high speed,  nearly 8 km per second, 
even those with a diameter of 1 cm pose a significant 
risk in the event of a collision.
  According to a study conducted by NASA in 2010, 
only 10 of the 4,700 space missions conducted since 
the dawn of space development account for one-third 
of all cataloged space debris produced. The mission 
which produced the most debris was an anti-satellite 
missile test conducted by China against its Fengyun-
1C weather satellite (FY-1C, international registration 
number 1995-025A) on January 11, 2007. By June 
2011 it had produced 3,217 pieces of debris, of which 
3,078 are still in orbit as of January 2012. This 
accounts for approximately 24% of flying objects other 
than orbiting payloads. While it is natural that Russia 
and the U.S., who have launched far more satellites in 
the past, account for more space debris than China, 
the amount of debris added by China’s destruction of 
only one satellite presents an unusual case.
2
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  If R represents the number of rocket bodies, D the 
number of debris produced by satellites (excluding 
non-operational payloads, although in some cases 
they are counted as space debris), and S the total 
objects in orbit, then (R+D)/S shows the proportion of 
orbiting objects other than payloads. Because China's 
anti-satellite missile test produced an extremely 
large amount of debris, the country accounts for an 
incredibly high percentage of non-payload orbiting 
objects: about 97%. In contrast, the ESA and Japan 
account for a fairly low amount of debris when 
compared to the global average. The U.S., Russia, 
France and India, among others, are around the global 
average. It should be noted that at the present moment, 
we cannot help but increase the amount of orbiting 
debris produced by payloads because rocket bodies 
inevitably add to the debris during launch. An issue 
that countries will need to cooperate on in the future 
will be controlling the production of space debris—
including rocket bodies—and disposing of it safely.
(2) Cases of Highly Dangerous Space Debris
a) Large amount of space debris from an anti-
satellite missile test
  On January 11, 2007, China tested a missile that 
destroyed the retired Fengyun-1C (FY-1C) weather 
satellite. It is thought that the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), which launched the missile, believed 
that there would be no trace of the satellite and that 
its components would burn up in the atmosphere. 
However, the satellite’s destruction actually vastly 
increased the number of flying objects in orbit, and 
most fragments have not disappeared. The space 
agencies of other countries heaped criticism on China 
for increasing the danger of space debris collisions. 
This is because the destroyed satellite’s remnants are 
in a polar orbit at an altitude of nearly 800 km, where 
many countries’ Earth observation satellites revolve 
around the Earth.
b) Nuclear-powered satellite re-entries and current 
operations
  On January 24, 1978, Cosmos 954, a Soviet maritime 
reconnaissance satellite, fell on the snowy plains 
of northwestern Canada. While no people were 
hurt, Cosmos 954 scattered numerous components 
contaminated with radiation from the nuclear reactor 
that powered it. The Canadian government demanded 
roughly 14 million dollars to pay for the recovery 
and decontamination. The Soviet Union paid Canada 
around 3 million dollars as compensation for the 
damage. By 1988, before the Soviet Union broke up, 
it had launched 37 satellites with onboard nuclear 
reactors of the same model, of which five have re-
entered the atmosphere and 32 are still in orbit. The 
U.S. has also launched many satellites equipped 
with nuclear batteries fueled by plutonium. Some are 
planetary probes that have traveled far from Earth, 
but many still orbit our planet. Although none are said 
to have fallen back to Earth yet, we must continue to 
monitor them.
Country/
Organization
Orbiting Objects Objects No Longer Orbiting
Total
Payloads Rocket Bodies (R)
Satellite 
D e b r i s 
(D)
Subtotal 
(S)
( R + D ) /
S*1 Payloads
R o c k e t 
Bodies
Satellite 
Debris Subtotal
USA 1112 653 3111 4876 77.2% 794 612 4052 5458 10334
Russia 1457 985 3674 6116 76.2% 2468 2729 8958 14155 20271
ESA*2 48 6 38 92 47.8% 9 7 15 31 123
France*2 55 129 308 492 88.8% 8 62 607 677 1169
Japan 128 43 35 206 37.9% 28 57 140 225 431
China 120 66 3430 3616 96.7% 57 90 556 703 4319
India 50 15 114 179 72.0% 9 10 267 286 465
Others 630 31 83 744 16.0% 61 11 116 188 932
Total 3600 1928 10793 16321 78.0% 3434 3578 14711 21723 38044
Table 1 : Registered Orbiting Objects at End of 2011
Source: Compiled by the Science and Technology Forecast center based on Reference #2.
*1 (R+D)/S represents the proportion of non-payload objects in orbit.
*2 Because European rockets are developed by the ESA and launched by a French company, Rocket Bodies are attributed to the 
ESA only in the case of ESA satellite launches and are attributed to France when satellites are unrelated to the ESA.
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c) Terminated large satellite re-entries
  Outside of satellites equipped with nuclear reactors, 
there is also a great risk of a major disaster caused by 
the re-entry of a large inoperable satellite. As shown 
in Figure 2, there has been a series of incidents since 
September 2011 in which large satellites that have 
lasted beyond their useful life have re-entered the 
atmosphere and sent large components flying down 
from space and towards the Earth at high speed.[3] 
There is a particularly high risk posed by satellites 
launched up until the 1990s, when space debris 
countermeasures were inadequate. The Rossi X-ray 
Timing Explorer (RXTE) is an American x-ray 
telescope that is expected to descend in 2014 or later. 
Figure 2 shows examples of recent and predicted large 
satellite re-entries.
  The risk of disaster posed by these sorts of objects 
falling from space is one aspect of the burden we bear 
from increased activity in space. The international 
community is demanding that space-faring countries 
take it upon themselves to take sincere safety 
measures. We especially must not forget that a country 
which causes a disaster in another one due to a falling 
satellite is liable for damage under the Outer Space 
Treaty.
d) Satellite collisions in space
  As the number of satellites and space debris 
increases, so, too, does the likelihood of collisions 
between flying objects in space. If two satellites 
collide, then it can cause a major disturbance, even 
on the Earth’s surface. Although there have not yet 
been any collisions between operational satellites, 
an operational satellite did hit a non-operational 
satellite on February 10, 2009, when Iridium 33, a 
communications satellite operated by U.S. company 
Iridium Satellite LLC (now Iridium Communications 
Inc.), was involved in a lateral collision over Siberia 
with Cosmos 2251, a retired Russian military satellite.
  It is very difficult to make advance predictions of 
satellite collisions. Furthermore, calculating collision 
predictions enough to prevent all such accidents would 
require enormous time and expenditures. In Iridium’
Owner Name Launch Year Re-entry Date Landing Site
USA UARS 1991 Sep 24, 2011 South Pacific
Germany ROSAT 1990 Oct 23, 2011 Bay of Bengal
Russia Fobos-Grunt 2011 Jan 15, 2012 Chile Pacific Coast
USA RXTE 1995 2014 - 2023 -
Table 2 : Recent Large Satellite Re-entries and Possible Future Re-entries
Source: Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center from various materials.
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Figure 1 : Rapid Increase in Debris Due to Satellite Destruction and Collisions
Source: Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center from 
data published every January in the Satellite Situation Report from 
2006 through 2012.
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s case, it was cheaper to launch a replacement satellite 
than to predict collisions. Furthermore, because the 
company operates more than 66 satellites, they can 
surmise that even if one is lost, they can use a backup, 
so a collision will not affect communications services.
(3) The Risks of a Continuous Increase in Space 
Debris
  Figure 3 shows the increase in space debris over the 
past few years. This graph was compiled from space 
debris figures for the U.S., Russia, China and other 
countries as posted in the Satellite Situation Report 
from 2006 through 2012. The amount of Chinese 
space debris rose sharply in 2007 due to the anti-
satellite missile test, while American and Russian 
space debris jumped up in 2009 after the collision 
between their satellites. If the amount of space debris 
continues to increase at the pace set thus far, then we 
may enter a phase in which space debris collisions 
create more debris, and thus more collisions, and so 
on.
  In September 2011, the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) and the National Research Council 
(NRC) released a report recommending that NASA 
draw up a strategy to deal with space debris and 
formulate policies to remove debris and lessen the 
danger. The NRC suggested specific steps for NASA 
to take: record, analyze, report and share information 
on spacecraft defects; hold a public debate on space 
debris; and take initiatives in consideration of the long-
term problems for the public.
2-2 The Risks of Space Weather
(1) Space Weather and Space Weather Forecasting
  The environment surrounding the Earth is far from 
quiet: particles and radiation fly about and induce 
electromagnetic activity to create a highly unstable, 
variable area. While the Earth’s surface is protected 
because the atmosphere significantly mitigates these 
dangers, humanity is not entirely unaffected by them. 
This is why the variable environment around the Earth 
is called “space weather.”
  The main indicators for space weather are the 
speed of solar wind and the amount of plasma. The 
electrical charge of the plasma in solar wind reacts 
with the Earth’s magnetosphere to produce aurorae 
over the poles and electrical potential difference (i.e. 
voltage). While the focus has been on monitoring what 
can be observed of the situation of the ionosphere 
and terrestrial magnetism,[1] in recent years, space 
telescopes have made it possible to observe the 
Sun and predict solar activity even hours or days in 
advance.
  Space weather forecasting is observing this sort of 
solar activity and changes in the space environment, 
predicting space weather and reporting this 
information to the public via researchers.
(2) Harmful Effects of Space Weather Variability 
on the Earth’s Surface
  While a solar maximum that would have a great 
effect on space weather is predicted for 2013, in early 
2012 we are already entering a time when we need to 
be cautious: for example, large solar flare warnings. 
Solar weather is worst when it poses a high risk of 
damaging solar panels on satellites operating in space 
or harming their internal circuitry. It can also have 
an electromagnetic effect on power lines and other 
ground-based equipment.
  One example of how a solar flare (an explosive 
phenomenon on the Sun’s surface) can affect satellites 
occurred in 2006 when a number of ESA satellites 
had their observation equipment power supplies 
knocked out. When satellites for practical uses such 
as communications/broadcasting satellites, Earth 
observation satellites and navigation/positioning 
satellites stop functioning, it can have a direct impact 
on society’s infrastructure.
  March 6, 2012 witnessed the largest solar flare in 
the preceding five years, and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the U.S. 
issued a warning that it could affect satellites, radio 
communications and more.
2-3 The Risks of Near-Earth Objects
(1) The Situation of Near-Earth Objects
  Near-Earth object (NEO) is a term mostly applied 
to near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), comets and 
meteoroids from other planets that fly in an elliptical 
orbit intersecting with the Earth’s. There are tens of 
thousands of NEAs among the numerous asteroids 
between Mars and Jupiter that approach Earth's orbit. 
Countries are working to understand asteroids that, 
while they will not strike our planet, may possibly 
pass within a distance equivalent to that between 
Earth and the Moon.
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  In November 2011, an NEA with a diameter of 400 
meters passed the Earth at a range equal to four-
fifths the distance between us and the Moon. Another 
asteroid of this size passed nearby 30 years before, and 
NASA predicts the next to occur in around 2028.
  There are a great many smaller NEAs that burn up 
after entering the Earth’s atmosphere. Recently, an 
example of a near-miss was when the asteroid 2012 
BX34 passed the Earth at a distance of approximately 
59,000 km on January 27, 2012.
  Even smaller meteoroids frequently hit the Earth. 
They can fetch a high price, as in the case of a 
meteoroid from Mars that landed in Morocco in 
January 2012 and was purchased by the University of 
Arizona.
(2) The Danger of an NEO Strike
  If a relatively large NEO happened to strike the 
Earth, it would cause major changes to the Earth’s 
environment. A large NEA hitting the Earth is the 
generally accepted explanation for the extinction 
of the dinosaurs. While these sorts of collisions 
are incredibly rare, when they do occur, they cause 
enormous harm to the Earth’s living creatures. NEOs 
must be monitored and data on their trajectories 
collected in order to quickly determine the risk of 
an impact. If there was a risk of an NEO hitting the 
Earth, then we would consider ways of changing the 
object’s trajectory.
Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA) Policy of Space-faring 
Countries
  Major space-faring countries have begun issuing 
policies on Space Situational Awareness (SSA) in 
order to reduce space environment risk. Western 
space related persons became more interested in 
SSA because of the Chinese missile test in 2007 that 
destroyed a Chinese own satellite.
  The International Code of Conduct (CoC) for 
Outer Space Activities put forward by Europe is 
a cooperative international framework to reduce 
manmade space environment risk. Under this 
framework, countries with advanced space programs 
such as the U.S., Europe, Russia, Japan, China and 
India would coordinate their SSA activities and 
promote relevant policies to improve on the status 
quo. This would enhance their ability to deal with 
naturally occurring space environment risk posed by 
space weather, NEOs and the like by conducting joint 
monitoring and sharing information.
  The U.S. and Japan delegate the tasks of monitoring 
and investigating the aforementioned three types of 
risk between different organizations, and at present 
the subject of SSA in government policy is confined 
only to space debris. Europe has created an SSA 
program budget that deals with both space debris and 
space weather, but it still does not have integrated 
SSA policies for NEOs. China first referred to the 
three types of space environment risk in a 2011 white 
paper on space.[4] All the major space-faring nations 
should formulate comprehensive policies to deal with 
the three types of risk in the future and engage in 
international cooperation. The state of SSA efforts in 
each country/region is given below.
3-1 SSA Policy in Europe
(1) The European Space Agency SSA Program
  In 2009 the European Space Agency (ESA), a group 
of 19 European member countries (the most recent 
being Romania, which joined in 2012) and Canada, 
its lone associate member, established a budget for 
SSA to implement space debris countermeasures 
and space weather forecasting to complement the 
agency’s main programs for launch vehicle/satellite 
development and manned spaceflight. The size of the 
budget for the three-year preparatory period started at 
9 million euros in 2009, growing to around 10 million 
euros in 2010 and around 16 million euros in 2011. 
However, the budget dropped to 15.4 million euros in 
2012,[5] a modest amount for the first year of full-scale 
implementation following the preparatory program.
  Up to now, the ESA has set up a telescope in Spain 
to monitor space debris in geostationary orbit and 
built a European space weather observation network 
that should prove useful for SSA activities on into the 
future.
  Right now the ESA treats NEOs as a separate issue 
from SSA, but there is a proposal to link ground-based 
facilities, data distribution and the like with SSA.[6]
(2) EU Initiatives
  The European Union (EU) and ESA hold a regular 
meeting of administrators (the ESA Council at 
Ministerial Level). At the seventh meeting held in 
November 2011, the participants displayed their 
3
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awareness of the need to establish SSA response 
capabilities to protect Europe’s space assets.
  In March 2011, the European Council (EC) 
conducted a survey on awareness of the EU’s overall 
space program. Eighteen of the questions were about 
SSA. There were 608 respondents from 27 countries. 
First off, the survey found that around 97% of people 
are aware of the damage that solar flares and space 
debris cause to satellites. The respondents rated 
business sectors for how much they are affected by 
such phenomena on a five-level scale, with a rating 
of 5 being most highly affected. Those sectors that 
received many ratings of 4 or higher included aircraft 
and automobile navigation/positioning systems 
(73%) and weather forecasting and Earth observation 
satellites (69%). Furthermore, 57% of respondents said 
that the EU should make sure it can deal with SSA-
related problems.
  Meanwhile, the EU has also proposed the CoC, a 
multilateral cooperative framework to maintain order 
among the space programs of the world’s countries. 
The CoC is an attempt to win the support of major 
space-faring countries outside of Europe such as 
the U.S., Russia and Japan in dealing with the many 
problems associated with safety in outer space, and to 
foster a globally shared view of the CoC’s guidelines. 
The U.S. and Australia have already declared that 
they will be involved in these efforts, while Japanese 
Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba announced on 
January 25, 2012 that Japan will participate in the 
EU-led formulation of the CoC. It is thought that 
formulating international rules on the development 
and use of space and implementing them through 
multilateral cooperation will contribute to mitigating 
manmade space environment risks.
(3) Initiatives by Individual European Countries
  While one distinguishing characteristic of European 
space activities is that the ESA executes large projects 
that no one country can undertake alone and that are 
funded by multiple member states, these activities 
have a multilayered structure in that the space agencies 
of individual member states also execute their own 
domestic space programs. Although member states 
have conducted SSA-related initiatives on their own, 
they have not done so jointly.
  Examples of these go-it-alone efforts include 
ROSACE (an opt ical  telescope to monitor 
geostationary orbits) and TAROT (a telescope to 
track high-speed objects), managed by France’s space 
agency, the National Centre for Space Studies (CNES); 
Germany’s TIRA (the Tracking and Imaging Radar 
at FGAN); Norway’s Globus (a space monitoring 
radar); and Sweden’s EISCAT (a network of space 
monitoring radars). All of these facilities have been set 
up to monitor space debris. The French Air Force also 
operates a radar network, developed by The French 
Aerospace Lab (ONERA) to monitor space debris.
  In the future, rather than using this two-tiered 
structure to support each country’s equipment and 
fund the ESA, member states will likely head in the 
direction of funding the ESA so that it can manage 
SSA facilities for all of Europe in a balanced, 
continent-wide manner. Expectations are that each 
country’s equipment will continue operating under 
a primary center that will allocate roles through a 
network. Meanwhile, costs will also be cut by closing 
certain facilities. These and other measures will 
streamline the continent’s SSA efforts.
3-2 SSA as a Component of the New U.S. Space 
Policy
  In the United States, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) monitors space debris, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an agency 
administered by the Department of Commerce 
(DOC), observes space weather, while the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
certain universities and other organizations monitor 
NEOs.
  The New National Space Policy announced by 
the Obama administration in 2010[7] states that the 
direction of U.S space activities will be to display 
American leadership in space in order to make 
it a place that the countries of the world can use 
peacefully, and to sustain a stable space environment 
for humanity to obtain the many benefits of 
outer space. Furthermore, the policy warns that 
irresponsible behavior in space affects all the people 
of the world and asks all countries to act responsibly 
so that posterity will inherit the opportunity to use 
and explore outer space. Moreover, it promises that 
the United States will also act responsibly in space. 
Regarding SSA, the announcement states that the U.S. 
will focus on space debris caused by human activity, 
enhance the country’s capabilities, and bolster a 
common view of the issue by working together with 
other countries and industry.
  On January 17, 2012, the U.S. government released 
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a statement declaring that it will work with the EU 
to formulate an International Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space Activities in order to build a multilateral 
framework for the safe development and use of space, 
with a focus on dealing with space debris.
3-3 Space Debris Measures in Japan's Basic Plan 
for Space Policy
  In Japan, the idea of SSA has not yet taken root in the 
Basic Plan for Space Policy.[8] The Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA) handles space debris 
monitoring, mitigation measures and the like, the 
National Institute of Information and Communications 
Technology (NICT) monitors and forecasts space 
weather, while the National Astronomical Observatory 
of Japan (NAO) and incorporated NPOs study NEOs. 
Japan has not  integrated efforts to deal with space 
debris. The Basic Plan for Space Policy should be 
revised with an integrated approach to SSA and deal 
with space environment risk.
  The Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated in 2009 
names the following three space debris-related issues 
as subjects that concern the “preservation of the space 
environment.”
(a) Knowing the Distribution of Debris
  While JAXA and other organizations currently 
monitor debris with their space observation 
capabilities, they can only distinguish orbiting debris 
down to a meter in diameter. They do not have a 
detailed or accurate understanding of sub-meter debris 
that could destroy a satellite in a collision. In the 
future, JAXA wants to work with observational data 
from other countries with the goal of understanding 
exact orbital positions and other characteristics of sub-
meter debris.
(b) Minimizing the Creation of Space Debris
  Effective ways to minimize the creation of space 
debris are to keep components from flying off of 
operational satellites and to prevent retired satellites 
from exploding. In Japan, JAXA drafts its own 
guidelines to reduce debris, with which it strictly 
complies. Japan is promoting the preservation of the 
space environment by making sure to address the 
matter internationally, such as by actively participating 
in the creation of an international framework to 
reduce the amount of debris created. Japan is also 
pushing ahead with research on measures to protect 
satellites from debris, and on satellites that would limit 
ground damage after re-entering the atmosphere upon 
retirement.
(c) Steps to Remove Debris
  The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination 
Committee (IADC) and others point out the 
possibility that an increase in the amount of debris 
could lead to collisions between these objects, thus 
leading to a natural increase in the number of objects 
making up the debris. In Japan, the technology to 
capture debris or remove it from orbit (e.g. robots to 
capture debris and other technology) is still in the 
research phase. In the future, Japan will continue 
working with international partners, while promoting 
research with the goal of using small satellites and 
such to demonstrate technology to capture debris or 
remove it from orbit.
3-4 SSA Policy in the Chinese Space White Paper
  In the year 2011, China surpassed the U.S. by 
launching 19 rockets, second in the world only to 
Russia. The U.S. and Europe have warned China 
about SSA as the country has quickly ramped up its 
space program. In December 2011, around the start 
of China's twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), the 
country published “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” 
that year’s edition of its space white paper. It made 
mention of initiatives related to space debris, space 
weather and NEOs alongside major projects such as 
manned spaceflight and lunar exploration. The paper 
describes specific plans for countermeasures against 
space debris in particular. When we remember that 
the reason for the West’s heightened interest in SSA 
is the missile test China conducted to destroy one of 
its own satellites, we can interpret China’s positive 
space debris-related efforts as a response to the West’s 
reaction. If the white paper is a statement that China 
will not repeat the action that produced the massive 
amount of space debris from its anti-satellite missile 
test, we should welcome China taking a step towards 
coordinating with the international community.
Space Environment Risk 
Countermeasures
  Nowadays, many more countries recognize the 
existence of space environment risk. They should 
deal with this risk based on sound government policy. 
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What the three types of risk have in common is that 
we need to first set up arrangements for monitoring 
targets and then develop the technical capabilities to 
deal with each type.
4-1 Space Debris Countermeasures
  At present, many countries are monitoring or taking 
steps to protect against and minimize space debris. 
As yet, very few measures have been taken to remove 
particularly dangerous large debris.
(1) Space Debris Monitoring
  The U.S. constantly monitors space debris of at least 
a certain size. U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom) 
tracks 800 satellites and over 20,000 pieces of space 
debris in regular operation, and releases tracking 
informations to other countries as possible as it can. 
Even so, there is a great deal of untracked space debris 
because Stratcom is significantly lacking in personnel 
to track all objects flying around the Earth that could 
affect a satellite. Additionally, there is no country 
tracking satellites more than the U.S. does.
  Japan has also been relatively quick to set up and 
operate its own monitoring facilities. JAXA uses 
the space debris monitoring facility in Okayama 
Prefecture owned by the Japan Space Forum 
(JSF) to keep a daily visual watch on space debris 
in geostationary orbit, determine the trajectories 
of satellites in low-Earth orbit and conduct other 
monitoring. However, six to eight years have 
passed since the JSF facility was completed and its 
performance is inadequate. An issue warranting 
examination is how to beef up JAXA’s monitoring 
capabilities through international collaboration in 
order to add more monitoring facilities or improve 
performance.
  However, Europe, Russia, China and others monitor 
objects flying through space visually and with radar, 
allowing each to collect its own data that takes 
advantage of each country’s geographical traits. More 
international cooperation in monitoring should take 
place to supplement the limits of U.S. monitoring 
capabilities.
(2) Measures to Protect the Space Station and 
Satellites from Space Debris
  NASA runs a program that examines measures to 
protect the Space Station and satellites for practical use 
from space debris. The program’s central office is at the 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas.[9] NASA’s 
greatest concern regarding space debris protection 
is the threat to the safe operation of the International 
Space Station (ISS), where three to six astronauts are 
onboard at any time. The structure of the ISS protects 
it from particle-sized debris collisions with bumpers, 
but it has to regularly raise or lower its trajectory 
to avoid medium-sized and large space debris. The 
thrust generated by Russian and European supply 
ships docked at the ISS is used to change the station’s 
trajectory.
(3) Measures to Reduce Space Debris
  In February 2007, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted the Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines, recommended by the IADC, as a measure 
to reduce the amount of space debris. Countries 
that launch satellites are taking the necessary steps 
to reduce space debris in accordance with these 
guidelines. Of course, Japan is developing satellites 
based on the guidelines and taking measures to deal 
with space debris.
  China, which is becoming a major space-faring 
nation alongside the U.S. and Russia, is involved 
with the IADC, where it cited its steps to reduce the 
amount of space debris produced by satellites and 
launch vehicles in its 2011 Chinese space white paper. 
An example of China taking proactive steps to reduce 
space debris is its operating plan for the Tiangong-1 
space station launched in September 2011. After three 
Shenzhou spacecraft dock with Tiangong-1 and it 
completes its two-year mission, the plan calls for the 
space station to re-enter the atmosphere over a safe 
location.
(4) Development of Space Debris Removal 
Technologies to Avoid Satellite Re-entries
  The safest way to deal with the risks associated 
with a satellite re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere is 
to remove it before it descends on its own. There are 
many ideas about how to do this, including the use of 
a suction device to capture it or employing lasers to 
alter its trajectory. A satellite can be forced to re-enter 
the atmosphere in a planned manner that lands it in 
a safe place. This can be done by launching a chaser 
satellite controllable from the ground that will capture 
the target satellite. After docking, the chaser satellite is 
directed by its ground-based operator to use its thrust 
to maneuver it and the target satellite into a new re-
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entry trajectory.
  In February 2012, a Swiss university published an 
idea of developing a 1-kilogram capture satellite to 
conduct an experiment to seize a miniature satellite 
(also 1 kg) already in orbit and burn it up in the 
atmosphere. Although the size of the satellites is 
small, the idea received intense media coverage 
as a concrete example of how we might deal with 
space debris. The Innovative Technology Research 
Center, part of JAXA’s Aerospace Research and 
Development Directorate in Japan, is conducting 
R&D on technology for a system that would capture 
space debris and dispose of it from orbit. This idea 
has been around since the 1990s, when an entry to 
the annual Satellite Design Contest in Japan proposed 
using a chaser satellite to capture a target satellite with 
a suction cup-equipped arm, similar to the mechanism 
employed by an octopus’ tentacle. Japan would likely 
make a major contribution to the world’s development 
of space if it can safely remove space debris by 
employing its expertise in rendezvous technology and 
robotics.
4-2 Monitoring and Responding to Space Weather 
Fluctuations
  For a long time now, we have been learning 
about space weather through indirect means such 
as monitoring geomagnetism over our planet or 
observing the situation of the ionosphere. This 
mainly used to focus on dealing with noise in radio 
communications and the like, but now space weather 
has a significant effect on essential components of 
our infrastructure: satellites, aircraft, power lines, 
pipelines and more. Thus, we now have to take steps 
to protect satellite solar panels and electronics from 
harm posed by space environment risks.
(1) Monitoring by Solar Observation Satellites
  Our capabilities to observe the Sun with satellites 
have improved to provide early warning of changes 
in the solar activity. In recent years, the standard 
practice has been to place solar observation satellites 
at Lagrangian points to directly monitor solar activity 
and predict changes in solar weather.
  Figure 4 shows what is being observed by U.S, 
European and Japanese solar observation satellites. 
The observational data from U.S and European 
satellites placed at particularly gravitationally stable 
Lagrangian points (L1, L4 and L5) is used effectively 
for monitoring solar activity. The two STEREO 
satellites monitor the Sun from its sides at positions 
ahead and behind the Earth in its orbit, thus enabling 
NASA to predict, according to the Sun’s rotation, 
when enhanced activity will affect the Earth. Data 
from Hinode, the Japanese solar observation satellite, 
has also contributed to global efforts to monitor space 
weather.
(2) Space Weather Forecasting Sites of Various 
Countries
  At present, the 13 major space-faring nations 
have set up websites providing up-to-date space 
weather forecasts for the general public. All of them 
operate in a partnership with the International Space 
Environment Service, an organization within the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO).
a) United States of America
  In the U.S., NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction 
Center  (SW PC) uses  dat a  f rom it s  GOES 
geostationary satellites to compile information for 
space weather forecasting. The SWPC website 
publishes daily information on observations and 
predictions.[10]
Name Owner/Operator Orbit Mission
Launch 
Year Subject of Observation
GOES USA/NOAA Geostationary Weather Observation
1994 
onward
Solar X-ray images, X-rays, protons 
(hydrogen ions), electrons
SOHO ESA/NASA L1 Solar Observation 1995 Coronal mass ejection (CME)
STEREO USA/NOAA L4 & L5 Solar Observation 2006 Lateral solar activity
Hinode Japan/JAXA Polar Orbit Solar Observation 2006 Coronal holes on Sun's surface
Table 4 : Main Solar Activity Observation Satellites
Source: Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center from various materials.
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  The top page shows the latest image of the Sun, 
along with the degree of geomagnetic storms, solar 
radiation storms and radio blackouts. Geomagnetic 
storm forecasts use a six-level scale indicating the 
disturbance they will create: None, Minor, Moderate, 
Strong, Severe and Extreme. Similarly, the site uses 
a six-level scale for particle/ion density in the event 
of solar storms of 10 MeV or greater and, if radio 
blackouts are forecast, the maximum luminosity of 
solar X-rays.
b) Europe
  The ESA mainly forecasts space weather by releasing 
images of the Sun taken by the Solar & Heliospheric 
Observatory (SOHO), a joint ESA-NASA project, 
at the ESA Space Weather Web Server.[11] However, 
compared to other country’s websites, this one’s 
weather forecasts are tailored more for experts. It does 
not provide easily understandable indicators as NOAA 
does.
c) Japan
  The NICT publishes daily observational information 
at the Space Weather Information Center (SWC) 
website, with sources including U.S. satellites and 
Hinode, the Japanese solar observation satellite.[12]
The top page uses graphics to provide a summary of 
observational information.
  Furthermore, the Space Weather News website 
provides more accessible information for the general 
public with daily space weather forecasts in a format 
closely resembling terrestrial weather forecasts.[13]
d) China
  The National Space Weather Monitoring and 
Warning Center, which belongs to the National 
Satellite Meteorological Center, publishes information 
on its website that includes three-day space weather 
forecasts.[14]
e) Russia
  The Space Research Institute (IKI) of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences (RAN) runs a space weather 
forecast service. Established in 1965, the IKI was 
involved in Mars and Venus space probe projects, 
but now it conducts observations of the Earth and 
scientific research on near-Earth space to study its 
effects on ecosystems and elsewhere. Part of this work 
is the research on and the distribution of information 
about space weather forecasts. The IKI website’s 
content includes data on geomagnetic storms.[15]
(3) Countermeasures by Satellite Operators Using 
Space Weather Forecasts
  Government organizations and companies that 
operate satellites (e.g. communications/broadcasting, 
weather, navigation/positioning satellites) providing 
us with important information every day reference the 
space weather forecasts provided by various countries 
and control their satellites to protect them from threats 
such as geomagnetic storms.
  Based on this information, the countermeasures they 
take include changing a satellite’s orientation so that 
the surface of its solar panels are not facing towards a 
geomagnetic storm, or putting the entire satellite into 
an energy-conserving safe mode to maintain minimal 
functionality.
  In addition, the International Space Station is 
moved to a safer location when space weather poses a 
potential health hazard to the astronauts on board.
  Space weather can affect the Earth’s surface as 
well as outer space. For example, power utilities 
pay attention to space weather to avoid the danger 
of irregular currents in power lines caused by 
electromagnetic induction.
  Other than the above, astronomers, amateur radio 
operators and others also pay attention to fluctuation 
in space weather.
Name Operator Country Main Telescope Caliber Number of Asteroids Monitored
NEAT NASA USA 1 m 11,000+
Spacewatch University of Arizona USA 1.8 m 20,000+
Bisei Spaceguard Center Japan Space Forum Japan 1 m ~  5500
Table 5 : Main NEA Monitoring Facilities
Number of asteroids monitored is current as of February 2012.
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4-3 Near-Earth Object Monitoring and Safety 
Measures
(1) NEO Monitoring by Various Countries
  A number of countries monitor NEOs with 
observatories and satellites. The Near Earth Objects-
Dynamic Site (NEODyS)[16] is a website that lists all 
of the world’s observatories and telescopes that are 
now monitoring asteroids and comets or have done 
so in the past. It also allows visitors to view data on 
near-Earth asteroids (NEAs) observed the day before. 
However, there are not many satellites that can find 
NEAs efficiently. Figure 5 shows what kind of NEA 
monitoring takes place at major facilities in the U.S. 
and Japan.
  NEODys lists 109 Japanese observatories and 
personal telescopes distributed across 30 of the 
country’s prefectures. The Bisei Spaceguard Center 
in Okayama Prefecture is the most active NEO 
monitoring site. The center uses data from a telescope 
with a caliber of 1 meter and equipped with a CCD 
camera to observe space debris in geostationary 
orbit. It can also detect NEAs. However, most NEO 
monitoring in Japan is currently performed voluntarily 
by NPOs and civilians. To properly monitor NEOs, 
the country needs to set up an official monitoring 
infrastructure.
(2) Measures to Deal with NEOs that May Strike 
the Earth
  Even if we could monitor the trajectories of all NEAs 
and comets and determine the existence of any NEOs 
that might strike the Earth and when, at present there 
are very few concrete measures we could take in 
response. However, there are investigations already 
underway on how to possibly avoid a collision.
  In December 2009, a committee formed by the 
Russian Federal Space Agency (FSA) to investigate 
ways of avoiding a possible collision with the asteroid 
Apophis in 2036 published a plan to do so. There are 
worries that Apophis, with a diameter of 350 meters, 
could turn 500,000 square kilometers of land into 
desert were it to strike the Earth.[17] Some method of 
altering the asteroid’s trajectory would be necessary 
to avoid a collision. Because this would require the 
development of equipment especially for this purpose, 
the committee suggested that this could become an 
international project.
  While NASA, based on earlier data, announced 
that Apophis had a small 1 in 45,000 chance of an 
impact on Earth on April 13, 2036, a recalculation of 
Apophis’ trajectory using the latest data has revised 
the likelihood of a collision down to 1 in 250,000.
  The technology described earlier in this paper to 
safely capture space debris and make it re-enter 
the Earth’s atmosphere may help us develop the 
technology needed to deal with a dangerous asteroid 
like Apophis in the future by altering its trajectory.
What Japan Should Do Next
  Japan also needs to put more effort into mitigating 
space environment risk by having an active Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA). Given the monitoring 
that is conducted now, we cannot entirely rule out 
this risk. We must recognize that it could pose a 
grave threat to humanity’s existence and to society’s 
infrastructure.
  However, while Europe, the U.S., China and others are 
working out policies formulated with an awareness of 
SSA, the concept itself has still not taken root in Japan. 
Different organizations and research groups deal with 
the three types of space environment risk, but they 
are not in fact exclusive of each other. For example, 
if Japan developed space environment observation 
satellites that can monitor space debris, solar weather 
and NEOs and had multiple groups collaborating by 
sharing observation data, then we could expect that to 
have a synergistic effect. To do this, Japan should gain 
a comprehensive understanding of space environment 
risk and establish measures to deal with it, such as by 
revising the Basic Plan for Space Policy. With regards 
to space debris in particular, Japan should coordinate 
with the U.S., Europe, Russia, China and others to 
encourage the formulation of the Code of Conduct, an 
international framework for space activities.
  Japan needs to continue engaging in each of the 
following concrete activities to deal with the three 
types of space environment risk.
(1) There are limits to the capabilities of the U.S., the 
current leader in this field, to track the growing 
amount of space debris. Each country should 
contribute to the effort by taking advantage 
of its own geographical traits and technical 
capabilities. While of course Japan is developing 
satellites in compliance with its Space Debris 
5
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Mitigation Guidelines, the country should be 
proactive and take the global lead, such as by 
setting up monitoring facilities and developing 
debris mitigation technology. On the technical 
front, Japan should especially upgrade current 
performance in optical and radar observation.
(2) Japan also has new opportunities worldwide to 
research and develop technologies to capture large, 
uncontrollable space debris and bring it back to 
Earth in a safe location. Japan should employ its 
advanced rendezvous technology and robotics to 
research and develop a viable space object capture 
system.
(3) Space weather forecasts are now essential 
information to protect satellites for practical use 
that are integrated with society’s infrastructure, 
as well as to protect ground-based facilities from 
adverse effects. These forecasts are needed to 
guarantee the continued operation of these public 
services.
(4) While the improved performance of observational 
equipment such as optical telescopes and CCD 
cameras has made the monitoring of NEOs 
more efficient, Japan needs to build a monitoring 
infrastructure (e.g. training relevant personnel) 
and operate it on a continual basis. In addition, 
measures to prevent a giant NEO from possibly 
striking the Earth in the future would likely 
be examined as an collaborative, international 
endeavor, so Japan should bring along its advanced 
technological prowess while actively participating 
in international partnerships.
  In order to execute the above policies, there is an 
urgent need for Japan to first understand what the 
world is doing about SSA and know what the country 
needs to do, and then define the direction of Japan’s 
SSA efforts in a policy paper. Meanwhile, Japan also 
needs to consider making efforts to train personnel to 
carry out activities that mitigate space environment 
risk.
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Japanese Researchers' Awareness Concerning 
the Use of Advanced Measurement and 
Analysis Instruments in the Life Sciences
Kazuhito Akasaka, Yasuko Hayashi and Hiromi Omoe
Life Innovation Unit
 Introduction
   Measurement and analysis are an important key 
technology to produce world-leading, original 
findings. In the scientific community, the memory of a 
Nobel Prize awarded for the research and development 
of a mass spectrometer is still fresh in our minds.
  In the field of the life sciences, dramatic performance 
advances in next-generation sequencers now allow 
us to map enormous amounts of genomic data 
and identify the genetic causes of diseases. The 
future will see a need to make effective use of new, 
advanced measurement and analysis instruments—in 
accordance with research goals—in order to expand 
research and development and spur innovation in the 
life sciences.
  In 2003, the Science and Technology Foresight 
Center (STFC) conducted a survey on the use of 
life science instruments. The results indicate that a 
relevant issue is the reliance on foreign-made (i.e. non-
Japanese) instruments.[1] Later on, in 2011, Professor 
Masashi Yanagisawa at university of Tsukuba raised 
a question on  a newspaper  in terms of the price gap 
between instruments provided in Japan and the United 
States, which conducted an another written survey 
on the use of foreign-made instruments in Japan. 
The STFC then held a workshop, to which it invited 
experts with a wide range of perspectives concerning 
the instruments. After the STFC presented with the 
results of the latest survey, the participants  discussed 
the current state and issues of use of the  instruments 
and the direction to take in the future. 
  The main purpose of this report is to present the 
content of this workshop. Chapter 2 compiles the 
content of the written survey report, while Chapter 3 
summarizes the workshop discussions that revolved 
around its results. The reader should note that some of 
1
the discussions also touched on an interview survey 
conducted after the workshop.
Result of the written survey
   First, the STFC utilized its network of experts to 
conduct a written survey on the use of foreign-made 
instruments and the prices in Japan.
2-1 Written Survey Overview
   The registrants in the network, as of March 2011, 
are 2,196 experts who work in science and technology 
for industry, government and academia, allowing 
the STFC to collect a broad range of opinions over 
the internet. The  survey was conducted March 10-
25, 2011. There were 228 respondents, making for a 
response rate of 10.4%.
   Sixty-four respondents had main backgrounds in 
life sciences, accounting for 28% of all respondents. 
Following life sciences, the major research sectors 
included nanotechnology/nanomaterials (21%), 
the environment (10%) and information and 
communications (10%). The characteristics of the 
responses in life sciences, were basically highlighted 
by comparing it with those given from whole research 
sectors except for life sciences.
   It should be noted that the term “instrument” in this 
report refers to advanced measurement and analysis 
equipments such as electron microscopes, mass 
spectrometers, X-ray analyzers, nuclear magnetic 
resonance spectrometers, DNA amplifiers, DNA 
sequencers and SNP analyzers. Instruments provided 
by companies based in the U.S. are called “American 
instruments.” Likewise, instruments supplied by 
companies based in Europe, Asia (excluding Japan) 
and Japan are called “European instruments,” “Asian 
instruments” and “Japanese instruments,” respectively.
2
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Figure 1 : Written Survey Respondent Field of Research Breakdown
Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center
2-2 Heavy Usage of Foreign-Made Instruments in 
Life Sciences
  In the 2003 survey,[1] the share of Japanese 
instruments used was lower in the life sciences 
compared to other f ields of research such as 
nanotechnology/nanomaterials, indicating heavy 
usage of foreign-made instruments.
  When respondents were asked whether the 
proportion of foreign-made instruments they use had 
changed in the past five years, 41% of those in life 
sciences answered it had “increased considerably” or 
“increased somewhat.” By contrast, only 18% gave 
these responses in other fields, while 72% stated that 
their usage was unchanged (see Figure 2). These data 
shows that it tends to use foreign-made instruments 
in life sciences more frequently than other research 
sectors. 
2-3 Par ticular ly Heavy Use of American 
Instruments
  When asked which foreign-made instruments 
(“American,” “European,” “Asian” or “other 
countries’”), the results showed that “American” 
inst ruments were used the most by 73% of 
respondents who work in the life sciences, followed 
by “European” at 27%. No respondents acknowledged 
using “Asian” or “other countries’” instruments 
more than any others. Outside of the life sciences, on 
the other hand, “American” instruments were most 
likely to be used the most by respondents, at 54% (see 
Figure 3). These data suggests that  life sciences make 
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Figure 2 : How has the amount of foreign-made instruments you use 
changed in the past 5 years?
Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center
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heavier use of American instruments than other fields 
of research.
2-4 Foreign-Made Instruments Chosen for Both 
Performance and Prevalence
   Respondents were allowed to make multiple 
selections to answer why they choose to use foreign-
made instruments. Together, “superior performance” 
and “the standard in the research field” made up over 
half the selections, at 29% and 27%, respectively. 
These were followed by “no Japanese instruments 
in the market” and “can obtain highly reliable 
and reproducible experimental data,” showing 
that foreign-made instruments are selected both 
for their performance and prevalence (see Figure 
4). Few respondents chose the other selections, 
reflecting researchers in life sciences rarely choose 
the equipment from points of views such as the 
maintenance service, the price, and the ease of use. 
  Compared to other fields of research, a high 
proportion of respondents in life sciences selected “the 
standard in the field,” while few chose “no Japanese 
instruments in the market.” These results show 
that in life sciences, the standardization of foreign-
73 27
1 1
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Asian
54 44
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Life Science: n=64
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Figure 3 : What country produces most of the foreign-made 
instruments you use?
Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center
Life Science: n=119 (multiple responses)
Non-Life Science: n=267 (multiple responses)
Figure 4 : Why did you select the foreign-made instruments you use? 
(Select top two choices.)
Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center
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made instruments has been proceeding over those 
made in Japan, and researchers prefer to collect data 
using foreign-made instruments for the international 
publications.
2-5 Roughly 40% Sees Especially Large Price 
Gap between Japan and the U.S.
  When asked about the cost of purchasing foreign-
made instruments in Japan, 39% of respondents 
answered that it was either “considerably expensive” 
or “20-30% more expensive” than doing so in the 
U.S. In the same question, 29% of respondents gave 
these same answers regarding purchases in Europe 
and 11% regarding purchases in Asia outside of Japan. 
Compared to other fields of research, there was a 
more striking recognition in life sciences of a price 
gap, particularly between Japanese and American 
instruments (see Figure 5).
  However, over half of respondents chose “no answer” 
to these questions. The authors believe that many 
researchers may be in a setting that makes it difficult 
for them to obtain information on instrument prices 
overseas.
2-6 Summary
   The results of the written survey show a tendency 
to make heavy use of foreign-made instruments in 
life sciences, particularly American instruments. 
Researchers mainly choose foreign-made instruments 
because of their good performance as well as because 
of their prevalence and their status as the international 
standard. These results conform with the results of the 
2003 survey.[1] Furthermore, compared to researchers 
in other fields of research, a high proportion of those 
in the life sciences feel that there is a foreign-made 
instrument price gap between Japan and the U.S. 
In the 2003 survey as well,[1] a large proportion of 
respondents from the life sciences answered that 
instrument prices in Japan are even higher than in 
the U.S. These results indicate that there have not 
been any major changes since the latest survey in 
the reasons why researchers opt for foreign-made 
instruments or their perception of prices. Within 
the scope of examples in the STFC’s preliminary 
survey, prices of American instruments in Japan are 
around twice as expensive as in the U.S., but this is 
roughly equal to other places outside the U.S., thus 
not contradicting the results of the abovementioned 
survey.
Ins t r ument  Pr ice - Focused 
Discussions
  Next, the STFC organized a workshop to which 
it invited experts with a range of perspectives 
concerning instruments (users, purchasing/
management, development, etc.) in order to add 
some multifaceted considerations of current issues 
concerning the use of instruments and the direction to 
take in the future. There were 15 participants in all. In 
addition to the chair, Dr. Masashi Yanagisawa, there 
were two university professors, four from the research 
promotion and management departments of university 
and public research institutes, four from company 
R&D departments and four government officials.
  First, after presenting the results of the written 
survey, they entered a discussion on the use of 
instruments and related issues. All participants had 
fairly similar recognition of the heavy use of foreign-
made instruments, so their discussion on this topic 
Figure 5 : How do instrument prices in Japan compare to other countries?
Compiled by the Science and Technology Foresight Center
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merely confirmed the facts. Much of the time was 
spent discussing the price gaps between Japan and 
other countries. This chapter will summarize the 
participants’ recognition of the current state of 
affairs and their awareness of problems related to the 
domestic-overseas price gap, as well as ideas for steps 
to resolve issues.
3-1 Lack of Opportunities for Many Researchers 
and Purchasing Managers to Learn of 
Instrument Prices Overseas
   Most of the respondents in Figure 5 gave no answer. 
It suggests  that most researchers and purchasing 
managers are not in a position to know the prices 
of instruments overseas, and such a situation on the 
demand side is a reason why there is not an active 
discussion over the domestic-overseas instrument 
price gap.
< Key Discussion Points >
・ Many researchers do not know the actual selling 
price of instruments in Japan or abroad. Even 
insiders in the U.S. have experienced refusal on 
the part of their affiliated institutes to disclose 
instrument prices.
・ The job of the researcher is merely to select 
the needed instrument. Typically, the relevant 
department in charge handles price negotiations, in 
which the researcher does not have an opportunity 
to be involved.
3-2 Domestic Prices are Inevitably Higher
   Generally, the Japanese subsidiary of an overseas 
manufacturer is the importer of a foreign-made 
instrument, which is then sold to clients through a 
domestic dealer. Since import processes generate 
various costs, domestic prices are inevitably somewhat 
higher than overseas. The main costs that push up 
prices are purchasing, exchange rates, and legal 
compliance work and personnel expenses added on to 
sales and maintenance.
< Key Discussion Points >
・ The Japanese subsidiaries that import instruments 
also play roles as import procedure agents, refer 
maintenance services, etc. Shifting these costs push 
up prices. It is rather uncommon for a purchaser 
to interact directly, for example by directly 
corresponding in English or paying airfare to 
bring over a technician when a directly imported 
instrument breaks.
・ The exchange rate used for catalog prices are set to 
mitigate the risk of a rate fluctuation that could make 
the yen somewhat cheaper. Thus, the value of the 
yen is generally set lower than the actual exchange 
rate.
・ The participants cited supplementary sales and 
maintenance work such as manual translation, 
advertising expenses, maintenance training 
seminars, demonstration instrument purchasing/
maintenance/relocation, service parts storage and 
preparing backup instruments.
・ Regulations must be followed in any country, with 
laws in Japan such as the Electrical Appliance and 
Material Safety Act and the Poisonous Material 
Control Law. Datasheets on the safety of reagents 
and other documents must be translated into 
Japanese.
・ Personnel expenses include paying for procedures to 
import an instrument and quality checks.
・ In addition to the above, each company involved in 
the processes between import and sale take their cut, 
thus raising the end price.
・ Instrument purchase prices can vary even if 
maintenance service costs are included. In 
Japan, instrument prices are often set under the 
assumption that there will be some small amount of 
maintenance. In the U.S., the price only includes the 
cost of the instrument itself and a separate contract 
must be concluded for maintenance services.
3-3 Scope to Narrow the Domestic-Overseas 
Price Gap
  While there are factors behind the domestic-overseas 
price gap other than those listed in Section 3-2, it is 
suggested  there is scope to narrow the gap from its 
present size. When a Japanese researcher learns about 
market prices overseas, it can result in a lower price 
during negotiation. If the manufacturer feels that the 
market holds promise for the future, they may sell the 
instrument for a low price.
< Key Discussion Points >
・ There have been cases in which dealers parallel 
import instruments that have been quoted at nearly 
double the price in the U.S., which they then sell for 
around half the quoted price.
・ The laboratory of a Chinese researcher who returned 
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to China from the U.S. was able to purchase 
instruments at roughly 90% the price in the U.S. 
While the authors believe that one reason why the 
price was approximately the same is that in China, 
these transactions are handled in U.S. dollars, thus 
eliminating any foreign exchange issues. However, 
this does not fully explain the lower price than in 
the U.S. It is thought that it could be because U.S. 
manufacturers want to enter China's vast market.
3-4 Other Opinions
   There are many factors hindering the fall of 
instrument prices in the Japanese market. These 
include the market structure, the number of rival 
manufacturers, and the poor alternatives for bidding 
on the candidates for purchasing models.
< Key Discussion Points >
・ Many of the top-selling companies in the domestic 
market in 2001 were from the U.S. or Europe. In 
life sciences, foreign firms account for a particularly 
high share.[2] The market mechanisms that rely on 
foreign-made instruments make it difficult to hold 
instrument prices down.
・ Laser microscopes are one type of instruments for 
which there is no domestic-overseas price gap, but 
this is because there are no international competitors 
to domestic manufacturers. Meanwhile, the price 
of endomicroscopes in Japan is twice that in the 
U.S. because there are no Japanese manufacturers 
competing in this field.
・ In the case of expensive instruments such as next-
generation sequencers, there are few candidates 
to choose from and few venders handling them, 
leaving little room for multiple bids.
3-5 Workshop Summary and Future Direction
   The workshop allowed the participants to share 
information on the current state of affairs, which 
included instrument prices in overseas markets and 
purchasing by other research institutes. Nearly all 
participants said that first of all, researchers need to 
be made aware of the domestic-overseas price gaps 
for foreign-made instruments. For example, if a handy 
information source for checking overseas prices were 
made available, then researchers could negotiate prices 
after referencing going market rates.
  There are numerous factors that go into setting the 
prices of foreign-made instruments. Many participants 
in this workshop are of the opinion that if users took 
the cost of import procedures, maintenance and 
inspection, then they would be able to utilize foreign-
made instruments more efficiently. Meanwhile, 
workshop participants used their past experience 
to determine that it is possible to shrink the current 
domestic-overseas price gap. It was pointed out that 
vendees need to learn as much as they can about 
the instrument prices in overseas markets and make 
effective use of research funds.
  Participants said that in the near-term, the first step 
towards making more effective use of foreign-made 
instruments would be to stimulate the used instrument 
market, which is an established market in the U.S. 
bioventures, for example, helps new companies 
procure low-cost instruments. Next, participants were 
of the opinion that special zones should be made and 
that companies, universities, research institutes and 
other organizations within an area should be allowed 
to easily share and relocate instruments. Furthermore, 
if multiple universities, for example, were to team up 
and increase their purchasing power to order large 
amount of products constantly, then participants 
thought that could bring prices down. In the long-
term, they pointed out the importance of encouraging 
domestic instrument development and creating a 
market to compete with foreign-made instruments.
Conclusion
   From the results of the written surveys and the 
opinions of workshop participants, it is suggested that 
perhaps half the people working in life sciences are 
in an environment that makes it difficult to obtain 
information on overseas instrument prices. The 
authors expect that this report will be used as a chance 
to share information with as many people in this field 
as possible.
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ライフサイエンスにおける先端的計測・分析機器の使用に関する国内研究者意識
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　アンケート調査の結果からも
ワークショップ参加者の意見から
も、半数程度のライフサイエンス
関係者は海外での機器価格情報を
得にくい環境にいる可能性が考え
られる。できるだけ多くのライフ
サイエンス関係者と情報を共有す
る機会の一つとして、本レポート
が活かされることを期待する。
1）　中塚勇、横田慎二、桑原輝隆、「先端的計測・分析機器の現状と今後の課題～科学技術専門家ネットワーク　アンケート
調査結果～」、文部科学省科学技術政策研究所、2003 年 7月（調査資料–98）
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文部科学省　科学技術・学術審議会　先端研究基盤部会　研究開発プラットフォーム委員会　先端計測分析技術・機
器開発小委員会（第 5回）では、2010 年のライフサイエンス関連機器の国内販売実績は、海外メーカーが上位を占め
ているという状況が報告されている。
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